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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a model to explain the widely used investment mandates in the institutional asset
management industry based on two insights: First, giving a manager more investment flexibility weakens
the link between fund performance and his effort in the designated market, and thus increases agency
cost. Second, the presence of outside assets with negatively skewed returns can further increase the
agency cost if the manager is incentivized to pursue outside opportunities. These effects motivate narrow
mandates and tight tracking error constraints to most fund managers except those with exceptional
talents. Our model sheds light on capital immobility and market segmentation that are widely observed
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The institutional asset management industry has experienced rapid growth in the last two
decades. In 2008 the global asset management industry managed a total of around $90 tril-
lion, through various types of funds, such as pension funds, mutual funds, insurance funds,
hedge funds, private equity funds, and exchange traded funds. This sheer size already makes
institutional investors a key player in the ￿nancial markets. Their distinctive institutional
incentive structures also make their preferences and investment characteristics very di⁄er-
ent from those of individual investors. The Bank for International Settlements initiated a
working group on incentive structures in the institutional asset management industry. By
interviewing more than 100 industry practitioners from 14 countries, the working group
identi￿ed several general trends in this industry. One of them is the use of more stringent
investment mandates, i.e., ￿a tiering and narrowing of investment mandates, enhanced by
an increasing emphasis on relative performance measurement, narrowing tracking errors and
more pervasive use of other investment constraints, such as limits on investing in speci￿c
securities or diversi￿cation rules.￿(BIS report, 2003.) This trend is puzzling￿ from an in-
vestment e¢ ciency perspective￿ because stringent mandates limit the fund managers￿ability
to take advantage of investment opportunities outside their mandates.1 As we will discuss
later, this trend can have important implications for asset market dynamics.
What motivates the use of stringent investment mandates? After all, a typical expertise
related argument implies that managers with superior expertise in certain markets will volun-
tarily choose to invest in their specialized markets without the aid of mandates. In practice,
investment mandates are often re￿ ected and enforced by constraints on funds￿tracking errors
of designated indices. What determines the cross-sectional di⁄erence in funds￿tracking error
tolerance?2 Which managers and to what extent should be incentivized to pursue outside
investment opportunities? How should they be compensated? In this paper, we provide
an agency-based model to address these questions. Our model also incorporates negatively
skewed risk, a widely recognized challenge to ￿nancial institutions due to the limited liabil-
ity of traders and fund managers, to analyze its e⁄ects on funds￿incentive structures and
investment strategies.
1Jame (2010) ￿nds evidence that trades made by pension funds in non-S&P 500 stocks signi￿cantly
outperform their trades in S&P 500 stocks, and that tracking error constraints imposed on pension funds
weaken the performance of their trades by roughly 30 basis points per year.
2An argument based on investors￿demands for specialized funds can explain the existence of invest-
ment mandates that accompany specialized funds, but cannot explain the varying degree of tracking error
constraints across funds.
1The asset management industry has a complex incentive structure. Financial service
companies, such as Fidelity and TIAA-CREF, o⁄er families of investment funds for investors
to choose from and typically charge a ￿xed fee based on asset under management. New fund
in￿ ows after superb fund performance provide implicit incentives for the fund family to hire
a capable fund manager (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1997), and Brown, Harlow, and Starks
(2006)). An equally important aspect which has not received much attention in the empirical
literature, is that the majority part of individual fund managers￿compensation is a relative
performance based bonus (BIS report 2003).3 These observations suggest that the asset
management industry builds on two layers of implicit and explicit incentives: one layer of
implicit incentives from investors to fund families, and another layer of explicit incentives
from fund families to fund managers. The literature has developed distinctive approaches to
analyze the e⁄ects of these implicit and explicit incentives. The career-concern framework
has been widely adopted to analyze the implicit incentives, while the optimal contracting
approach has been used to study the explicit incentives.4
Our model adopts the optimal contracting approach to focus on explicit incentives of
individual fund managers. This approach allows us to derive investment mandates, which
are usually explicitly stated in fund prospectuses and enforced by managers￿compensation
contracts. Speci￿cally, we analyze a model with a risk neutral principal delegating capital to
a risk averse fund manager. In light of the two-layered incentive structure discussed above,
one can interpret the principal as a fund family, which hires the manager to manage one
of its funds. Di⁄erent from the aforementioned models, our model allows the manager to
face investment opportunities in several markets instead of one. The manager has a primary
market. While his expertise endows him some private information about the asset return
in this market, he can improve the precision of his information by exerting unobservable
costly e⁄ort. Thus, the principal needs to incentivize the manager to work. In addition, the
manager￿ s expertise also gives him a free signal about the asset return in another market,
whose identity is known only to the manager. This free signal is not as precise as his signal
3￿The size of the bonus component in individual asset managers￿compensation varies considerably across
countries. However, at least in some countries, there seems to be a general trend towards a higher share of
variable compensation in total pay over recent years.... US managers can earn average bonuses of 100% and
higher. In the United Kingdom, where the median fund manager will get a bonus of about 100%, exceptional
asset managers can earn as much as six times their base salary in the form of bonuses.￿(the BIS report,
2003, page 23)
4For models building on the career-concern approach, see Berk and Green (2004), Dasgupta and Prat
(2008), Vayanos and Woolley (2008), Malliaris and Yan (2009), Makarov and Plantin (2010), Guerrieri and
Kondor (2012), and Kaniel and Kondor (2012)); for models using the optimal contracting approach, see
Bhattacharya and P￿ eiderer (1985), Heinkel and Stoughton (1994), Ou-Yang (2003), Palomino and Prat
(2003), Cadenillas, Cvitanic, and Zapatero (2007), and Dybvig, Farnsworth, and Carpenter (2010).
2about the primary market, but is nevertheless useful.
We deviate from a commonly used framework (e.g., Bhattacharya and P￿ eiderer (1985)
and Dybvig, Farnsworth, and Carpenter (2010)), in which the principal incentivizes the
manager to acquire information and truthfully report the information to the principal, who
then makes investment decisions based on the reported information. Our model builds
on the premise that the principal is unable to execute the investment decisions. Instead,
the manager is responsible for not only acquiring information but also making investment
decisions, consistent with the common practice in the money management industry. And,
as only the manager can implement the investment decisions, we assume further that the
incentive contract cannot be contingent upon the manager￿ s investment positions.5 Under
this setting, the principal needs to motivate the manager not only to exert e⁄ort in acquiring
information about the primary market, but also to make e¢ cient investment choices to take
advantage of his information about the primary market as well as the secondary market. We
are particularly interested in analyzing the joint implications of these two dimensions on the
optimal incentive contract and the resulting investment e¢ ciency.
A key insight of our model is that there is a trade-o⁄ between ex post investment e¢ -
ciency and ex ante incentive provision e¢ ciency. Allowing the manager to take advantage
of outside opportunities when he fails to ￿nd a good opportunity in the primary market is
ex post e¢ cient, but implementing this e¢ cient strategy weakens the link between the fund
performance and his unobservable e⁄ort in the primary market. This is because the manager
can generate good performance either by e⁄ort in the primary market or by random luck (an
opportunity unrelated to e⁄ort) from outside. In the language of Holmstrom (1979), imple-
menting the e¢ cient investment strategy reduces the ex ante incentive provision e¢ ciency
by making benchmarking more di¢ cult.
Building on this trade-o⁄, our model shows that it can be optimal to con￿ne the manager
in his primary market depending on his cost of e⁄ort and outside investment opportunities.
Intuitively, this holds true if his cost of e⁄ort is su¢ ciently high or if his free outside op-
portunities are only modest. Although the principal cannot directly observe the manager￿ s
investment position, he can implement such a strategy by imposing a tight limit on the
manager￿ s tracking error of the primary market return. More precisely, he can prevent the
5In practice, a fund manager can obscure his positions through complex ￿nancial contracts and thus to
game any compensation scheme that bases upon his positions. The scandals of rogue traders, such as Nick
Leeson of the bankrupted British bank Barings and Jerome Kerviel of French bank Societe Generale, vividly
demonstrated that they were able to hide their positions from their supervisors for prolonged periods. These
observations motivate us to consider incentive contracts based only on the fund performance and the primary
market return.
3manager from seeking any outside opportunity by penalizing the manager￿ s good perfor-
mance if it deviates substantially away from the benchmark primary market return. On the
other hand, if the manager￿ s e⁄ort cost is su¢ ciently low or if his outside opportunities are
abundant, it is optimal to incentivize him to pursue opportunities both inside and outside
the primary market by granting a su¢ cient tolerance on tracking error and by rewarding
him for beating the primary market.
The incentive to pursue outside opportunities can also induce the manager to seek unwar-
ranted negatively skewed risk even when he ￿nds no good opportunity. As widely recognized
by academia and policy makers, active risk seeking is a severe problem in designing institu-
tional risk management system and incentive structure.6 Lowenstein (2000) attributes the
￿nancial crisis of the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management to its negatively skewed
trading strategy, which gives steady positive returns for a prolonged period only to be fol-
lowed by a loss of all of the previous gains and almost all of its capital. Rajan (2010) and
Acharya, Cooley, and Richardson (2010) highlight seeking of tail risk by many ￿nancial ￿rms
such as AIG and Lehman Brothers as a key contributing factor to the recent ￿nancial crisis.
We incorporate a market whose return has an unattractive mean but a negative skewness,
i.e., it gives a modest positive return most of the time but a large negative return once in
a while. This market is attractive to the manager because he gets compensated for the
positive return with a high probability, and leaves the principal to bear the huge loss due to
the manager￿ s limited liability. To prevent the manager from seeking this unwarranted risk,
the optimal contract in our model will compensate him even if his performance is inferior
but the bad performance can be traced to the poor return in his primary market, in order to
raises the manager￿ s opportunity cost of seeking the skewed risk.7 Through this payment and
the necessary increases in other payments to o⁄set its negative e⁄ect in motivating e⁄ort,
the presence of negatively skewed risk substantially increases the agency cost.8 As a result,
6For example, such strategies can be selling out-of-money options and under-writing of credit default
swap contracts (CDS). These strategies allow an institution to pocket steady cash ￿ ows until a large payout
caused by the options maturing in the money or defaults of the bonds covered by the CDS contracts.
7Malliaris and Yan (2009) and Makarov and Plantin (2010) analyze fund managers￿risk-seeking incentives
driven by convex fund ￿ ow by using career-concern models. The career-concern models are not convenient
for analyzing investors￿active deterrence of managers￿risk seeking because investors are typically passive in
these models. In contrast, our model shows that the incentive to seek negatively skewed risk is an inherent
by-product of incentivizing fund managers to pursue pro￿table opportunities, and deterring such risk seeking
may require inducing them to use suboptimal investment strategies.
8The mechanism of a negatively skewed risk di⁄er from that of the standard volatility risk in delegated
asset management (e.g., Ou-Yang (2003), Palomino and Prat (2003), and Cadenillas, Cvitanic, and Zapatero
(2007)). These papers typically ￿nd that pay for performance is still useful even when fund managers can
choose return volatility. In our model, incentive compensation on the primary market itself triggers active
seeking of negatively skewed risk outside the primary market, which motivates the use of narrow investment
4only managers with exceptional talents can have broad investment mandates.
Taken together, our model provides an agency-based explanation for funds with narrow
investment mandates, together with a set of testable implications for varying degrees of
investment ￿ exibility across funds. For example, funds tend to face more stringent investment
mandates when their managers have lower ability or when they work in more obscure markets
that are di¢ cult to analyze. In light of the easier accessibility of negatively skewed risk in the
increasingly complex ￿nancial markets, our model also explains the aforementioned trend of
narrowing investment mandates in the delegated asset management industry.
The widely used narrow investment mandates can have important implications for asset
market dynamics. Du¢ e (2010) highlights capital immobility, i.e., capital often fails to ￿ ow
to liquidity distressed markets that o⁄er pro￿table opportunities, as an important factor
in understanding asset market liquidity. According to our model, once investors distribute
their capital into di⁄erent market segments through institutionally managed funds, agency
considerations constrain most fund managers from moving capital into other liquidity dis-
tressed markets. Instead, the strategic decisions of allocating capital across di⁄erent market
segments are often left to the less informed investors themselves. As a result, the ￿ ow of
capital is likely to be delayed. This explanation of capital immobility based on institutional
constraints at the originating end of capital ￿ ow is distinct from the other explanations
based on information barriers about asset fundamentals at the receiving end.
Narrow investment mandates can also help explain the de facto segmentation of vari-
ous asset markets from the broad ￿nancial markets in the absence of explicit regulatory
and physical constraints on investment. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001),
Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron (2007), Garleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman (2009),
and Bekaert et al. (2008) provide evidence of risk premia for market-speci￿c risk factors
in the corporate bond market, mortgage-backed securities market, S&P 500 index option
market, and emerging stock markets. These ￿ndings are broadly consistent with our model
in the sense that investors heavily rely on professional fund managers to invest in these
markets and agency considerations can motivate narrow mandates on the fund managers.
As a result, they are exposed to market speci￿c risk. With fund managers likely being the
marginal investor, these markets can exhibit premia for market speci￿c risks and thus de
facto segmentation.
The literature has recognized the importance of restrictions on investment strategies in
motivating fund managers￿e⁄orts. Admati and P￿ eiferer (1997) point out that in the absence
mandates.
5of portfolio restrictions, a manager can use portfolio choice to o⁄set the incentive intended
by his compensation contract. By using a setting whereby the principal can directly observe
and contract on the fund manager￿ s investment positions, Dybvig, Farnsworth, and Carpen-
ter (2010) show that imposing portfolio restrictions can improve the e¢ ciency of incentive
provision. Our model adopts a more general setting in which the principal cannot observe
the manager￿ s investment positions, and derives the optimal incentive contract that relies
on penalties against tracking errors to enforce any intended investment strategy. This set-
ting allows us to highlight the con￿ ict between incentive e¢ ciency and investment e¢ ciency.
This con￿ ict also di⁄erentiates our model from Bhattacharya and P￿ eiderer (1985), who
show that penalties against tracking errors can motivate a fund manager to truthfully report
his information to his principal.
Our paper adds to the literature on e⁄ects of agency frictions on ￿nancial market in-
e¢ ciency. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Stein (2005) focus on agency risk in arbitrage
trading￿ fund managers are reluctant to take on arbitrage positions because if asset prices
deviate further away from fundamentals in the future, investors will withdraw money and
thus causes forced liquidation. In contrast, our paper emphasizes that agency frictions can
lead to narrow investment mandates, which limit fund managers￿ability to take advantage
of pro￿table opportunities outside their mandates.
The paper is organized as follows. We present a basic model in Section 2. Section
3 extends the model to incorporate negatively skewed risk, and Section 4 discusses the
model implications. We conclude in Section 5. Appendix A provides technical proofs, and
Appendix B presents an alternative model setting to demonstrate robustness of the basic
model presented in the main text.
2 The Basic Model
2.1 Setup
We consider a single-period principal-agent model where a risk-neutral principal delegates
capital to a risk-averse agent.9 As we discussed before, the asset management industry has
a two-layered incentive structure with fund families charging investors ￿xed management
9Risk neutral principal is interested in maximizing expected fund return, and this assumption, by ruling
out various hedging and diversi￿cation needs, allows us to focus on agency frictions only. See Massa (2003)
and Mamaysky and Spiegel (2002) for studies of how heterogeneity among individual investors in terms
of investment horizon and risk preferences can motivate mutual fund families to o⁄er funds specializing in
di⁄erent markets or strategies.
6fees while compensating individual fund managers based on fund performance. We focus on
the explicit incentives of individual fund managers who directly make investment decisions.
Thus, we interpret the principal-agent relationship as a fund family (the principal) hiring a
fund manager (the agent) to manage one of its funds.
The manager￿ s utility function over consumption  (￿) satis￿es  (0) = 0, 0 (￿)  0, and
00 (￿)  0. Throughout we focus on the speci￿cation that
 () = 
1¬￿, ￿ 2 (01). (1)
The principal hires the manager to actively invest his money in a primary market, which
we denote by market . We can broadly interpret this market as a speci￿c market sector,
such as the treasury bond market, the mortgage bond market, the U.S. stock market, or a
regional stock market. We assume for simplicity that the return from this market can only





 with probability 05
¬ with probability 05
. (2)
The manager￿ who possesses certain expertise that normal investors lack￿ obtains a
private signal  regarding the likelihood of the market going up or down. The signal takes
two possible values 1 or ¬1 If the return is positive (or negative), the signal is more likely
to take the value 1 (or ¬1):
Pr( = 1je  = ) = Pr( = ¬1je  = ¬) = 05 + ￿ + ￿. (3)
The term ￿ + ￿  0 measures the precision of the signal  in revealing the return in
market . There are two components in the signal precision: the ￿rst part ￿ captures
the manager￿ s knowledge about the market without any e⁄ort on the job, while the second
part ￿ represents his e⁄ort in acquiring additional information. The e⁄ort ￿ takes binary
values, 0 and , corresponding to ￿shirking￿and ￿working￿respectively. By working hard
(e.g., conducting a thorough analysis), the manager improves the signal precision by . We
impose ￿ +  ￿ 05 to make the probability meaningful. To di⁄erentiate the precision of
the signal with and without the manager￿ s e⁄ort, we denote 
 as the signal with e⁄ort and
0
 as the signal without e⁄ort.
The e⁄ort incurs a private (utility) cost  to the manager and is unobservable to the
principal. For simplicity, we also assume that the manager exerts e⁄ort before he receives
7any signal.10 We assume that the manager has an additive utility function over consumption
and e⁄ort:
 (￿) =  () ¬


￿ where ￿ 2 f0g
The fund has one unit of initial capital. To deliver the key insight without getting into
unnecessary complications, we simplify the manager￿ s investment choices. First, the manager
cannot short sell any asset and cannot borrow either.11 Second, he always invests all of the
fund in one asset: either in market , the risk free asset, or something else.12 We normalize
the return of the risk-free asset to be zero. Then if he observes a positive signal on market
, the expected return is positive and he will invest the fund in market ; if he observes a
negative signal, then he should stay out of market . But, should he then invest the fund in
the risk-free asset or something else? In reality, a fund manager often has expertise beyond
his primary market. An important question faced by every fund is whether the manager
should be incentivized to pursue outside opportunities when the primary market lacks a
good one.
We capture this idea by assuming that the manager can access a set of outside markets.
These markets have independently and identically distributed returns with the same binomial
distribution as market . Before the manager makes his investment decision, he also receives
a free signal about one of these markets, which we denote by market . This market is
randomly drawn from the pool of outside markets. Neither can the principal observe the
signal, nor which market the signal is about. The precision of the manager￿ s free signal on
market  is ￿ 2 (012), i.e.,
Pr( = 1je  = ) = Pr( = ¬1je  = ¬) = 05 + ￿. (4)
We also assume that ￿ ￿ ￿, i.e., the manager is better informed about his primary
market.
Denote the manager￿ s investment choice by  ￿ f  0g where  2 f01g indi-
cates the manager￿ s investment position in market  with  2 fg, and 0 2 f01g is his
position in the risk free asset. The borrowing constraint requires that  + +0 = 1. We
denote the set of all feasible investment choices by  = fg. The fund￿ s return e  can take
three possible values, i.e., e  2 f0¬g
10We rule out the possibility that the manager makes his e⁄ort choice after he observes a free signal about
the market. Such a sequential setup complicates the analysis, but does not add much to the economic insight.
11Almazan et al. (2004) document that many mutual funds restrict short selling and leverages.
12We discuss the robustness issues related to these simplifying assumption in Section 2.5.
82.2 Optimal Contracting
2.2.1 Incentive Contract
The principal writes a compensation contract to induce e⁄ort and a certain investment
strategy from the manager. For e¢ cient incentive provision, benchmarking the manager￿ s
performance e  to his primary market return e  (i.e., using relative performance evaluation)
is bene￿cial. It would be useful to incorporate the return of market . But this is not feasible
because market  is randomly drawn from a set of outside markets and the principal does
not observe its identity. Thus, we focus on incentive contracts based on the fund performance
and the primary market return.13
Furthermore, we make a realistic assumption that the incentive contract cannot be con-
tingent upon the fund￿ s investment position. Contracting on fund positions is unrealistic for
several reasons. First, it is di¢ cult to ￿nd a single measure to summarize the investment
positions taken by a real-life fund, which typically holds many positions with di⁄erent char-
acteristics. Second, while fund families are better monitors of fund managers than investors
(e.g., Gervais, Lynch, and Musto (2005)), it is still infeasible for a fund family to continu-
ously monitor each individual investment position of its funds. If reporting of fund positions
can only take place at discrete intervals, it will induce window dressing by fund managers to
game the reporting system, invalidating the incentive intended by the compensation contract
that is based on the reporting. Finally, it is also possible for a fund manager to obscure his
positions through complex ￿nancial contracts, in order to game any compensation scheme
that is based on his positions. In fact, the scandals of rogue traders such as Nick Leeson of
the bankrupted British bank Barings and Jerome Kerviel of French bank Societe Generale
vividly demonstrated that they were able to hide their true positions from their supervisors
for prolonged periods.14
13In an earlier version of this paper, we have allowed the principal to observe the identity of market 
and therefore to write the incentive contract based on the return of market  as well. The key results of our
paper remain similar.
Besides, we can further show that peer evaluation, i.e., basing one manager￿ s compensation on his relative
performance to other funds trading in the same market, cannot help in optimal contracting. The reason is
simple: In our model, conditional on the true state of the primary market return, the signals are independent
across managers. Thus, if the contract incorporates the realized market returns, it has already used the
best information for relative performance evaluation (one can formally show this result using the su¢ cient
statistics argument in Holmstrom (1979)).
14Also note that while many mutual funds explicitly impose various restrictions on investment positions
such as short sales, use of leverages, and investing in derivatives, the enforcements of these restrictions often
rely on random auditing and ex post penalties of the funds￿advisors and the SEC, e.g., Almazan, et al.
(2004, footnote 2). This con￿rms the di¢ culty for fund investors to observe fund positions in practice and
the potential challenge in enforcing investment restrictions. Under the premise that investment positions are
not observable to the principal, our model not only justi￿es investment mandates but also derives penalties
9Thus, an incentive contract ￿ is a mapping from the information set ￿ generated by e 
and e  to non-negative payments to the manager:
￿ : ￿ ￿ f0g ￿ fg ! R+.
We rule out negative wages to the manager due to limited liability.15 The fund return can
take three possible values:  (up with a return of ) 0 or  (down with a return of ¬). The
return of market  can take two possible values,  (up) or  (down). There are 6 possible






2 ￿ as a possible outcome. It is easier to work with the payment in terms of




















 is the manager￿ s utility when the primary market is down but the fund
return is up. Then, 
 = ¬1 (￿
) is the cost of compensating the manager for this outcome.
2.2.2 Contracting Problem
For a given contract ￿ = f￿g the fund manager maximizes his expected utility by ￿rst








where  is the probability of outcome  The manager￿ s e⁄ort and investment choices ￿
and  determine the outcome probability fg We write ￿
￿ (￿) and ￿ (￿) as the manager￿ s
optimal e⁄ort and investment choices, respectively, in response to a given contract ￿.
By using di⁄erent incentive contracts, the principal can induce di⁄erent investment
choices from the manager. When the manager￿ s e⁄ort cost is su¢ ciently low, the ￿rst
best combination of e⁄ort and investment strategies is that the manager exerts e⁄ort in the
primary market and then follows a so called ￿two-tiered￿investment strategy, as shown in
Table 1: If the manager receives a positive signal about the primary market , he will invest
the fund capital in it; if not, he will invest in market  if his free signal about market 
against tracking errors as an enforcement mechanism for investment mandates.
15We assume that the manager is both risk averse and protected by limited liability. If we were assuming
a risk neutral manager, then limited liability would have generated a non-zero agency cost but the agency
cost would not be a⁄ected by e¢ ciency of benchmarking in implementing di⁄erent investment strategies.
The reason is that with risk neutral managers, it is optimal for the principal to shift all positive rewards to





) where the manager￿ s investment strategy is
identi￿able. This gives rise to the same agency cost across di⁄erent investment strategies.
10indicates a good opportunity; ￿nally, he will invest in the risk-free asset if his signal about
both markets  and  are negative. This strategy instructs the manager to take advantage
of opportunities outside his primary market. Alternatively, the fund can also implement
a ￿single-market￿strategy, as shown in Table 1: The manager will invest in the primary
market if his signal on the market is favorable and otherwise put the fund capital in the
risk-free asset. Relative to the two-tiered strategy, this strategy requires the same e⁄ort
cost but forgoes a valuable investment opportunity outside the primary market. As we will
show later, this seemingly inferior strategy dominates the two-tiered strategy under certain
conditions because of its more e¢ cient incentive provision.16
Table 1. Investment Strategies: Single-market versus Two-tiered strategies
Signal realizations 
 = 
 = 1 
 = 1
 = ¬1 
 = ¬1
 = 1 
 = 
 = ¬1
Single-market market  market  risk-free asset risk-free asset
Two-tiered market  market  market  risk-free asset
As the principal cannot directly observe the manager￿ s investment position, he has to rely
on the incentive contract to induce the manager to implement any intended strategy. Put
di⁄erently, when the principal ￿nds it optimal to use the single-market strategy, he cannot
just tell the manager not to invest outside the primary market. In order to enforce this
narrow investment mandate, the principal needs a set of detection and penalty mechanisms
for preventing potential violation. In our model, the principal can use the fund￿ s tracking
error relative to the primary market return to imperfectly detect the manager￿ s deviation
from investing in the primary market. By penalizing the manager for a large tracking error,
the principal can prevent such a deviation.
The manager has a reservation utility of  which represents his forgone outside oppor-








￿ (￿) ￿ 
Because of limited liability, the manager earns some positive rent in our model, and for
16In an earlier draft of the paper, we have also considered a symmetric setting, in which markets  and 
are ex ante symmetric to the manager in the sense that his endowed signals about the two markets have the
same precision and both can be improved by his personal e⁄ort. This symmetric setting allows us to evaluate
a so-called combined-market strategy, according to which the manager seeks to ￿nd the best opportunity in
these markets by exerting e⁄ort to improve his signals about both markets. We show that this strategy is
desirable if the manager￿ s cost of e⁄ort is su¢ ciently low￿ lower than the level derived for the optimality of
the two-tiered strategy. As this analysis substantially complicates the presentation but adds little additional
insight, we choose to leave it out of the paper and instead focus on the comparison between the single-market
and two-tiered strategies.
11simplicity throughout this paper we assume that  is su¢ ciently small so that the manager￿ s
participation constraint is not binding.
The principal￿ s payo⁄ from outcome  is the portfolio return minus the compensation
cost:
 = 1 + e  () ¬ 
¬1 (￿). (6)








subject to the manager￿ s participation and incentive compatibility constraints.
We can further decompose the principal￿ s expected payo⁄ into two components:
 =
X




where the ￿rst part is the expected fund return, which is determined by the manager￿ s
e⁄ort and investment strategy; and the second part is the expected cost of compensating the
fund manager. This decomposition suggests the following two-step method to solve for the
optimal contract: First, ￿nd the least costly contract to implement each of the two e⁄ort and
investment strategies; then, compare these least costly contracts to determine the optimal
contract that o⁄ers the highest expected net payo⁄ to the principal.
2.3 Single-market Strategy
We start with analyzing the least costly contract for implementing a single market strategy in
market , as indicated in Table 1. The contract induces the following e⁄ort and investment
choices from the fund manager: The manager exerts e⁄ort only in market ; after receiving
the signal 
, he invests all the fund capital in market  if the signal is positive, and invests
in the risk free asset otherwise, regardless of his signal  about opportunities outside the
primary market. Note that there is an opportunity loss when the manager￿ s signals suggest
that the primary market lacks a good investment opportunity while another market, market
, o⁄ers a good one (
 = ¬1 = 1).
2.3.1 Incentive Compatibility
The fund manager has two unobservable actions: exerting e⁄ort to obtain a precise signal
and making the investment choice. In contrast to the costly e⁄ort on information acqui-
sition, the investment choice per se does not involve any personal cost, and the incentive
12compatibility constraint regarding the investment choice is slack (which we will verify later)
when implementing the single-market strategy. Here, we discuss the manager￿ s incentive
compatibility constraint regarding his e⁄ort choice. Taking the manager￿ s investment choice











(05 + ￿ + )￿

 + (05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )￿
0
 + (05 + ￿ + )￿
0












) is the probability of state
e  =  (which is 05), multiplied by the probability of the manager receiving a positive
signal 
 = 1 conditional on e  =  and the manager exerting e⁄ort (which is 05+￿+).












 + (05 ¬ ￿)￿
0
 + (05 + ￿)￿
0





Therefore, the manager￿ s incentive compatibility constraint regarding exerting e⁄ort re-














In (10), the coe¢ cient of each utility term in the bracket gives the manager￿ s incentive
di⁄erential between ￿shirking￿ and ￿working￿ for a particular outcome . For instance,
consider ￿
. By working, the probability of getting ￿
 is (05 + ￿ + )2, while by shirking,
the probability becomes (05 + ￿)2 The di⁄erence between these two probabilities is
exactly the coe¢ cient 05 in front of ￿
 in condition (10). The higher this coe¢ cient, the
more e⁄ective the payment ￿
 in motivating the manager to exert e⁄ort. We also call this
coe¢ cient the incentive leverage of the payment.
2.3.2 The Least Costly Contract










¬1 (￿) = 05
￿
(05 + ￿ + )
¬1 (￿


























) are o⁄ equilibrium.
13subject to the incentive compatibility constraint in (10), which is binding in the solution.






, which represent poor performance relative to market
, have negative incentive leverages. Any payment to the manager for these outcomes is a
reward for failure and thus should be minimized to zero (i.e., ￿0
 = ￿
 = 0). On the other
hand, ￿
 and ￿0
 represent rewards for good performance in outcomes (
) and (0
) Using the

















(05 + ￿ + )
￿e
 (11)
where ￿ is the Lagrange multiplier for the incentive compatibility constraint in (10). Com-




We also need to specify payments for two o⁄-equilibrium outcomes (
) and (
) to prevent






We verify in Appendix A.1 that under these terms, the manager will never deviate to invest
in market . The following proposition summarizes the contract derived above.
Proposition 1 The least costly contract for implementing the single market strategy uses












The principal￿ s expected payo⁄ from implementing this strategy is

 = 1 + (￿ + ) ¬ (05 + ￿ + )
¬1 (). (13)
This contract benchmarks the manager￿ s performance to the return of his designated
market. The manager receives a positive reward if he secures the positive return of the
market or avoids its negative return. Otherwise, he receives nothing. Consistent with the
benchmarking idea, the same fund performance (0), could lead to two di⁄erent compensations
(0 or 
) depending on whether the market return is positive or negative.
Another notable point is that the contract gives a zero payment for both (
) and (
)
the outcomes in which the manager delivers maximum deviation from the primary market
return. These terms represent penalties against the manager￿ s tracking errors, which are
often used in practice according to the BIS report (2003). These penalties discourage the
manager from investing outside the primary market and serve the role of implementing a
narrow investment mandate.
142.4 Two-tiered Strategy
Implementing the single-market strategy imposes an e¢ ciency loss by restricting the manager
from taking advantage of opportunities outside the primary market. This subsection studies
a two-tiered strategy (see Table 1) which improves on this dimension: The manager exerts
e⁄ort on acquiring a precise signal 
 about market ; if this signal is favorable, he invests in
market ; if 
 is unfavorable but his free signal  indicates a good outside opportunity in
market , he invests in market ; otherwise, he invests in the risk free asset. Similar to the
single-market strategy, the two-tiered strategy also induces the manager￿ s e⁄ort in market
 However, in contrast to the single-market strategy, the two-tiered strategy instructs the
manager to pursue outside opportunities if necessary.
2.4.1 The Least Costly Contract
We derive the least costly contract for implementing the two-tiered strategy in a way similar
to the single-market strategy. By exerting e⁄ort and following the intended investment
strategy, the manager￿ s expected utility is
E
￿
 (￿)jexerting e⁄ort and following the two-tiered investment strategy
￿
(14)
= 025[(1 + 2￿ + 2) + (05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 + ￿)]￿

 + 025(05 + ￿ + )(05 + ￿)￿


+025[(1 ¬ 2￿ ¬ 2) + (05 + ￿ + )(05 ¬ ￿)]￿


+025(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 ¬ ￿)￿

 + 025(05 + ￿ + )￿
0
 + 025(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )￿
0
 ¬ 
The manager can also adopt a deviation strategy by shirking and then following the two-




 (￿)jshirking and following the two-tiered investment strategy
￿
(15)
= 025[(1 + 2￿) + (05 ¬ ￿)(05 + ￿)]￿

 + 025(05 + ￿)(05 + ￿)￿


+025[(1 ¬ 2￿) + (05 + ￿)(05 ¬ ￿)]￿


+025(05 ¬ ￿)(05 ¬ ￿)￿

 + 025(05 + ￿)￿
0
 + 025(05 ¬ ￿)￿
0












 ¬ (05 ¬ ￿)￿







This is an important constraint in implementing the two-tiered strategy.
The principal also needs to ensure that after receiving a negative signal about market 
and a positive signal about market , the manager is willing to invest in market  instead of
15the risk-free asset. Investing in market  exposes the manager to the risk that the realized
return might be negative, while investing in the risk-free asset allows the manager to lock
in the sure return 0. The comparison of the two depends on the structure of the manager￿ s
incentive contract. Speci￿cally, given 
 = ¬1 and  = 1, the manager￿ s expected utility
from investing in market  is
(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 + ￿)￿

 + (05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 ¬ ￿)￿

 (17)
+(05 + ￿ + )(05 + ￿)￿

 + (05 + ￿ + )(05 ¬ ￿)￿


while his expected utility from investing in the risk-free asset is
(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )￿
0
 + (05 + ￿ + )￿
0
 (18)
Implementing the two-tiered strategy thus requires (17) dominate (18):
(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 + ￿)￿

 + (05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 ¬ ￿)￿

 + (05 + ￿ + )(05 + ￿)￿


+(05 + ￿ + )(05 ¬ ￿)￿

 ¬ (05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )￿
0
 ¬ (05 + ￿ + )￿
0
 ￿ 0 (19)
This constraint also binds in the least costly contract.
The least costly contract minimizes the expected compensation cost E[¬1 (￿)]:
025[(1 + 2￿ + 2) + (05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 + ￿)]
¬1 (￿





























subject to the incentive constraints in (16) and (19) and that all payments are non-negative.
We denote the lagrange multipliers associated with the two incentive constraints as ￿1 ￿ 0
and ￿2 ￿ 0 respectively. The following proposition characterizes the least costly contract.
We also verify other deviation strategies based on this incentive contract in Appendix A.2.
Proposition 2 The least costly contract for implementing the two-tiered strategy gives zero








and positive payments for ￿
, ￿
, and ￿0





. Under the su¢ cient conditions (35) and (36) in Appendix A.2, this
contract also deters the use of other deviation strategies.








+(05 + ￿ + )(05 + ￿)
¬1 (￿








and the principal￿ s expected payo⁄ is
1 + ( + ￿ + 05￿) ¬ 

Proposition 2 shows that to encourage the manager to pursue potential investment op-
portunities outside his primary market, the least costly incentive contract tolerates greater
tracking errors than the one for implementing the single-market strategy (Proposition 1).
This di⁄erence is re￿ ected by the positive payment for the outcome (
), in which the fund
return beats the primary market return by two notches. Because of the large tracking error,
this seemingly good performance is not rewarded by the contract derived in Proposition 1.
Furthermore, the contract derived in Proposition 2 also provides a greater incentive slope,









In practice, hedge funds tend to be more tolerant of tracking errors and provide greater
incentive slopes, whereas mutual funds tend to be more restrictive on tracking errors and
give smaller incentive slopes. Thus, the contract derived in Proposition 2 is closer to the
hedge fund contracts, while the contract derived in Proposition 1 is closer to the mutual
fund contracts.
2.4.2 Higher Agency Cost due to Worse Benchmarking
Interestingly, the seemingly superior two-tiered strategy may be suboptimal because it ex-
acerbates the agency cost to incentivize the manager to exert e⁄ort in his primary market.
This negative impact originates from two channels. First, the additional investment ￿ exibil-
ity makes ￿benchmarking￿more di¢ cult because it introduces luck from market  into the
fund performance. This weakens the link between the fund performance and the manager￿ s
e⁄ort in market , and leads to less e¢ cient incentive provision. Second, implementing the
two-tiered investment strategy requires an additional constraint (19) on the incentive con-
tract, which further reduces its incentive provision e¢ ciency. The intuition for the second
channel is obvious. Thus, we focus on illustrating the ￿rst channel, which is also the key
economic insight of our model.
17The negative impact of investment ￿ exibility on incentive provision manifests itself in the
payment for the outcome  = (
). In implementing the two-tiered strategy, the probability
of this outcome is
 = 05(05 + ￿ + ) + 025(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 + ￿) (21)
The ￿rst term represents the situation that the primary market return is high (with prob-
ability 05) and the manager spots this opportunity (with probability 05 + ￿ + ). The
second term represents an additional possibility that the primary market return is high (with
probability 05) but the manager fails to spot it (with probability 05 ¬ ￿ ¬ ); instead,
the return in market  is also high (with probability 05) and the manager spots this one
(with probability 05 + ￿). The second term represents luck from market . Such luck
increases the probability for the principal to make the positive payment and thus adds to
the compensation cost.
More interestingly, the luck also reduces the incentive leverage of ￿
. If the manager
shirks, the probability of this outcome becomes
05(05 + ￿) + 025(05 ¬ ￿)(05 + ￿) (22)
Thus, the di⁄erence between (21) and (22) gives the incentive leverage of ￿
:
 = 05 ¬ 025(05 + ￿)
Comparing to (10) when implementing the single-market strategy, where  = 05, the
above incentive leverage is reduced by the possible luck from market . Intuitively, the
free luck from market  crowds out the need to exert e⁄ort to spot the good opportunity in
market  (if there is one). This crowding out e⁄ect, which is at work only when implementing
the two-tiered strategy, reduces the manager￿ s gain from exerting his e⁄ort in market  and
therefore his ex ante working incentives.
We call the ratio

 the cost to incentive ratio of the payment, which is ￿rst derived in
Holmstrom (1979).18 The numerator  captures a cost e⁄ect, i.e., the larger the probability
of the outcome , the higher the expected cost of each dollar promised to this outcome. The




 in Holmstrom (1979), where  is the probability density function of the perfor-
mance, and  is the marginal impact of action  on the density function. Holmstrom points out that

 is
the derivative of log likelihood, and interprets this measure as how strongly one is inclined to infer from the
performance that the agent did not take the assumed action.








05(05 + ￿ + ) + 025(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 + ￿)
05 ¬ 025(05 + ￿)
=
05(05 + ￿ + ) +
increased  due to luck from market 
z }| {
025(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 + ￿)




We have decomposed each term in the fraction relative to
05+￿+
  the corresponding cost
to incentive ratio in implementing the single market strategy. It is clear that the invest-
ment ￿ exibility unambiguously increases the cost to incentive ratio by raising the expected
payment and lowering the incentive leverage of the payment.
Overall, implementing the two-tiered strategy requires a higher expected compensation
cost, which we formally prove in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The expected compensation cost of implementing the two-tiered strategy is
higher than that of the single-market strategy, i.e.,   . Furthermore, the di⁄erence
monotonically increases with .
This proposition shows that in implementing the two-tiered strategy, the additional in-
vestment bene￿t 05￿ from encouraging the manager to pursue the opportunity outside
the primary market comes with an increased agency cost of  ¬  As the increased
agency cost monotonically increases with , the principal will prefer the narrowly mandated
single-market strategy if  is higher than a certain threshold ￿.
We can intuitively relate the model parameter  to the manager￿ s ability and the infor-
mation opacity of the primary market. As the e⁄ort cost of the more talented managers
is lower, the additional agency cost from encouraging them to pursue opportunities outside
their primary markets is also smaller. As a result, we have the following implication:
Implication 1: Fund managers with lower ability are more likely to be con￿ned in trading
a speci￿c market sector or asset class; on the other hand, managers with higher ability
tend to face less stringent investment mandates.
This implication is consistent with a casual observation that hedge fund managers tend to
be more talented than mutual fund managers,19 and they also face less stringent investment
mandates.
19See Kostovetsky (2009) for evidence of a drop in mutual fund returns as a result of a ￿ ight of top-
performing young managers from mutual funds to hedge funds.
19Furthermore, the e⁄ort cost is likely to be higher for managers whose primary markets
are more informationally opaque. This in turn leads to another testable implication:
Implication 2: Fund managers whose primary markets are more informationally opaque
face more stringent investment mandates.
2.5 Model Robustness
Our model makes several simplifying assumptions to make the analysis tractable. These
assumptions include the restriction preventing the manager from taking multiple positions
in markets  and  at the same time, the short-sale constraints in both markets  and ,
and the restriction on the manager￿ s position to be either 1 or 0 unit in each market. These
assumptions are not essential to the key economic insight of our model.
Appendix B presents an alternative model setting, which relaxes the restrictions on mul-
tiple positions and short sales. Speci￿cally, the manager can take either a long or short
position of one unit in the primary market , and at the same time he can also indepen-
dently take a long or short position of one unit in the secondary market . We show that the
key result derived from our main model prevails￿ when the manager￿ s cost of e⁄ort in the
primary market is su¢ ciently high or when the precision of the manager￿ s free signal about
market  is su¢ ciently low, motivating the manager to pursue the single-market strategy
that invests exclusively in the primary market is optimal even though the free signal about
the secondary market is nevertheless valuable. The driver of this result is the same as in Sec-
tion 2.4.2: Because the principal cannot directly observe the manager￿ s investment positions
and the fund performance aggregates the manager￿ s returns from both markets, investment
￿ exibility across both markets impedes the principal￿ s inference problem of the manager￿ s
e⁄ort. As a result, incentive provision becomes ine¢ cient and more costly.
The restriction on the manager￿ s position of 1 or 0 unit serves to prevent the portfolio
return from fully revealing the manager￿ s investment position. With both markets  and 
having binomial returns, allowing the manager to choose investment position in a continuous
range such as [01] would allow the principal to perfectly infer the manager￿ s position based
on his portfolio return and the primary market return￿ for example, if the principal can
design a contract to induce the manager to either invest 100% in market  or 99% in market
. However, the continuously distributed asset returns in reality render such a revelation
mechanism unrealistic. Thus, we do not believe that this assumption is essential to our key
economic insight.
203 An Extended Model with Negatively Skewed Risk
When incentivized to pursue investment opportunities outside his primary market, the man-
ager may also seek unwarranted negatively skewed risk even if his signals do not indicate any
good opportunity. In light of the recent ￿nancial crisis, many observers (e.g., Rajan (2010)
and Acharya, Cooley, and Richardson (2010)) had pointed out that excessive risk taking
(by AIG, Lehman Brothers, and other ￿nancial ￿rms), and in many cases active seeking of
negatively skewed risk, was a key contributing factor of the crisis. As highlighted by Rajan
(2010), such tail risk presents a great challenge to the ongoing reform of the ￿nancial indus-
try￿ s risk management system and incentive structure: ￿We have to ￿nd ways to reduce the
incentive to take tail risk even while rewarding bankers for performance so that they continue
to o⁄er innovative products that meet customer needs and lend to the risky but potentially
very successful start-up.￿
3.1 Negative Skewness and Analysis
We suppose that one of the markets outside the manager￿ s primary market, denoted by
market , has a zero expected return and a negative skewness, in addition to market 
speci￿ed earlier.20 Again, only the manager knows the identity of this market. Speci￿cally,





 with probability ￿ 2 (051)
¬
￿
1¬￿ with probability 1 ¬ ￿ 2 (005)
.
A higher value of ￿ leads to a more negatively skewed return, i.e., this market gives a
positive return  with a high probability ￿ but a large negative return ¬
￿
1¬￿ with a small
probability 1¬ ￿. The manager does not observe any signal about this market￿ market 
represents a pure gamble.21
20While in practice a fund manager can seek risk in either his primary market or any outside market,
this concern is perhaps more severe for outside markets. This is because his primary market is usually
tightly de￿ned and thus o⁄ers limited ￿ exibility to seek risk. On the other hand, once incentivized to invest
outside, the manager￿ s ￿ exibility to seek any type of payo⁄or risk in the complex ￿nancial universe is greatly
increased. Thus, our analysis focuses on the manager￿ s risk seeking incentive that accompanies his incentive
to pursue outside investment opportunities.
21To highlight the damage caused by market  to the manager￿ s incentive, we intentionally make its
expected return zero. This expected return per se is not a concern to the risk-neutral principal. Instead, as
we will highlight, the presence of this market not only erodes the manager￿ s e⁄ort incentive but also makes
it more di¢ cult to implement an e¢ cient investment strategy. It should be clear that making the expected
return of market  negative by further reducing its negative return will only strengthen our result.
21The presence of such a market further complicates the delegation problem between the
principal and the manager. Suppose that the manager is compensated by the incentive
contract derived in Proposition 2 which aims to induce e⁄ort and implement the two-tiered
investment strategy in markets  and  If the manager invests in market , this can be
detected only after the realization of loss ¬
￿
1¬￿ that is more severe than those from other
regular investments. When this occurs, limited liability implies that the principal can only
penalize the manager by paying him zero. On the other hand, if the outcome is positive,
the principal cannot identify the source of the good performance and has to compensate the
manager according to the contract.
The following scenario demonstrates this risk-seeking behavior clearly. Consider the
investment problem faced by the manager when he observes a negative signal in market 
and a positive signal in market  (i.e., 
 = ¬1 and  = 1). His expected utility from
investing in market  is

















which, under the contract in Proposition 2, is equal to (05 + ￿)[(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )￿
 +
(05 + ￿ + )￿
] His expected utility from investing in market  is ￿[(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )￿
+
(05 + ￿ + )￿
] as he will get compensated after market  gives a positive return and zero
otherwise. Thus, the manager will choose to invest in market  if and only if
￿  05 + ￿
That is to say, the manager will ignore a good opportunity in market  and instead seek
the unwarranted risk in market  if the negative skewness ￿ is su¢ ciently large. This
exactly captures the concern that compensation for positive performance can also motivate
the manager to seek negatively skewed risk.22
This illustration suggests that additional constraints are necessary to prevent the manager
from seeking the negatively skewed risk in market . It turns out that if the manager deviates
from the intended investment strategy, he prefers a double-deviation strategy to ￿rst shirk
and then seek risk in market  regardless of his signals. Deterring such a double-deviation
provides the most-binding constraint on the incentive contract.23 If the manager chooses to
22The incentive to seek negatively skewed risk will arise as long as the manager faces a su¢ ciently large
reward for good performance and is protected by limited liability. By endogenizing the manager￿ s com-
pensation contract through the agency problem, our model allows us to analyze the interaction between
e⁄ort-motivating incentive and risk-seeking incentive in determining the optimal incentive structure for fund
managers.
23This situation is similar to the optimality of double-deviation in the dynamic moral hazard problem
22shirk in the primary market and then to always invest in market , his expected utility is






His expected utility from exerting e⁄ort and following the two-tiered investment strategy is
given in (14). Thus, the additional constraint is
025[(1 + 2￿ + 2) + (05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 + ￿)]￿

 + 025(05 + ￿ + )(05 + ￿)￿


+025[(1 ¬ 2￿ ¬ 2) + (05 + ￿ + )(05 ¬ ￿)]￿

 + 025(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 ¬ ￿)￿


+025(05 + ￿ + )￿
0
 + 025(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )￿
0





The rewards for positive performance stimulate the risk-seeking behavior because the right-
hand side of this inequality increases with ￿
 and ￿
. If these payments are high, the contract
has to raise payments for other outcomes (possibly for bad performance), to increase the
opportunity cost of seeking the negatively skewed risk. As a result, adding this constraint
can further increase the agency cost of implementing the two-tiered investment strategy.
Recall that Proposition 2 shows that the least costly contract involves only three non-zero
payments, in the absence of the negatively skewed risk. With the negatively skewed risk in
market , we need to minimize the expected compensation cost in (20) subject to constraints
in (16), (19) and (23). The next proposition shows that when ￿ is su¢ ciently large, the








turn positive, and ￿
 turns positive before the other two.
Proposition 4 When ￿ is su¢ ciently large, the constraint in (23) is binding. Furthermore,
￿
 turns positive before ￿
 and ￿0
 under the su¢ cient condition that
05 + ￿  2￿ + 2
A positive payment ￿
 arises because it increases the opportunity cost for the manager
to seek the unwarranted negatively skewed risk, i.e., the left-hand side of (23). Although
we only prove that ￿
 turns positive before ￿
 and ￿0
 under the given su¢ cient condition,
numerically we have veri￿ed that ￿
 and ￿0
 always remain zero in a large set of parameter
values outside the su¢ cient condition.24
with private (hidden) saving, where the agent usually ￿nds it optimal to shirk and save concurrently, e.g.,
He (2012). As investment positions are not observable in our model, investing in market  plays the same





















Panel A: Incentive Payments




































Figure 1: E⁄ects of negatively skewed risk on the least costly incentive contract for implementing





 against ￿, while Panel B plots the expected compensation cost.
To further illustrate the e⁄ects of negatively skewed risk on the least costly incentive con-
tract for implementing the two-tiered strategy, we adopt the following baseline parameters:
 = 025 ￿ = 025 ￿ = 02  = 002  = 02 ￿ = 06 (24)




 as ￿ increases from 05 to 08 The risk-
seeking constraint in (23) starts to bind when ￿ passes 065, a level below 05 + ￿ = 07.
Consistent with our earlier discussion, this suggests that the double-deviation of shirking
and risk-seeking is more desirable to the manager than the single deviation of risk-seeking
only, and thus the constraint in (23) binds earlier than ￿  05 + ￿.
When ￿ is between 065 and 067 the least costly contract o⁄sets the risk-seeking
incentive by increasing ￿
, reducing ￿
 and ￿0
, and keeping ￿
 at zero. As we have discussed,
￿
 is useful for deterring risk seeking because its coe¢ cient on the left-hand side of (23) is
greater than that on the right-hand side. As a result, the expected compensation cost
increases with ￿.
role as private saving in that context.
24What makes ￿
 di⁄erent from ￿
 and ￿0
? Although their cost to incentive ratios






¬[(1 ¬ 2￿ ¬ 2) + (05 + ￿ + )(05 ¬ ￿)](15 + ￿), which is lower than (so the absolute value






















= ¬(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ ). Section 2.4.2 then tells





to distinguish (bad) performance from
(bad) luck. As a result, if the principal has to pay the manager that comes with a negative impact on e⁄ort





causes the least damage.













Figure 2: The increasing use of narrow mandates in the presence of negatively skewed risk. This
solid line plots ￿, the upper threshold on the manager￿ s e⁄ort cost parameter for implementing
the two-tiered investment strategy, against ￿ based on the baseline parameters given in (24). The
dashed line gives the threshold level when the negatively skewed risk is absent from the model.
When ￿ rises above 067, simply increasing ￿
 is not enough. Instead, the contract
gives a positive payment ￿
 even though it has a negative e⁄ect on inducing the manager￿ s
e⁄ort in the primary market. To counter the negative incentive e⁄ect brought on by ￿
, the




have positive incentive e⁄ects. Because of the intricate interaction between the manager￿ s
incentive-provision constraint and risk-seeking constraint, the expected compensation cost
increases dramatically with ￿ once it passes above 067
Furthermore, Figure 1 shows that the incentive slope ￿
 ¬ ￿
 decreases with ￿. This is
because ￿
 is particularly strong in motivating the risk-seeking behavior￿ when ￿ is large,
the coe¢ cient of ￿
 on the right-hand side of (23) exceeds that on the left-hand side. As a
result, the contract has to reduce ￿
 to mitigate such an incentive.
The increased agency cost makes the single-market strategy more desirable. Figure 2
plots the upper threshold ￿ of the manager￿ s e⁄ort cost for the optimality of implementing
the two-tiered strategy. When ￿ is below 065, ￿ is insensitive to ￿. As ￿ rises above
065 ￿ decreases with ￿. This plot suggests that in the presence of the negatively skewed
risk, only managers with su¢ ciently high talents (and thus low e⁄ort cost) are encouraged
to pursue investment opportunities outside their designated markets. The next proposition
formally proves this result.
Proposition 5 In the presence of the negatively skewed risk in market , the upper threshold
25￿ on the manager￿ s e⁄ort cost for the optimality of implementing the two-tiered strategy
decreases with the skewness parameter ￿.
3.2 Implications
Taken together, our analysis demonstrates that the presence of negatively skewed risk in-
creases the agency cost of encouraging the manager to pursue opportunities outside the
primary market. As a result, narrow investment mandates become even more desirable. It is
especially useful to interpret this result in light of the increasingly complex ￿nancial markets.
The rapid development of ￿nancial markets in recent years has greatly expanded the space
of ￿nancial securities and thus made it much easier to access negatively skewed risk, either
by buying a structured ￿nance product with the intended risk pro￿le or by selling an out-of-
money option like security. Together with this change in the investment environment, our
model explains the recent trend of the growing popularity of stringent investment mandates
and narrow tracking errors highlighted by the BIS report (2003).
Our model also shows that for those managers with exceptional talents, the optimal
incentive contract not only encourages them to pursue ￿ exible investment strategies but also
rewards them generously. Interestingly, the reward covers not just their good performances
but also their well-intentioned failures. The reward for failures might appear counter-intuitive
because of its seemingly negative incentive e⁄ect. But it helps deter risk seeking because the
managers stand to lose such a reward if they choose to seek outside risk. In other words,
since managers get paid generously for pursuing the intended strategies, they will ￿nd seeking
outside risk too costly as it jeopardizes the generous payments guaranteed to them.
Philippon and Reshef (2008) ￿nd that wages for ￿nancial jobs were excessively high
around 1930 and from the mid 1990s to 2006. They attribute the high wages to ￿nancial
deregulation during these periods, which made ￿nancial jobs more skill intensive and complex
and thus attracted better talents to the ￿nancial industry. In light of our analysis, ￿nancial
deregulation not only makes ￿nancial jobs more demanding, but also creates more room for
traders and fund managers to take on creative negatively skewed risk. As a result, higher
wages are necessary not only because the ￿nancial workers￿reservation wages were higher,
but also because the damages they could do to the ￿rms were also higher.
264 Discussions
The wide usage of narrow investment mandates in the asset management industry have im-
portant implications for asset market dynamics. In this section, we discuss such implications
on capital immobility and market segmentation.
4.1 Capital Immobility
The stringent investment mandates imposed on fund managers can lead to ￿capital immobil-
ity,￿i.e., capital often fails to ￿ ow to distressed markets that o⁄er pro￿table opportunities.
Du¢ e (2010) highlights this phenomenon as an important factor in understanding market
liquidity. For example, many pundits observe that capital immobility was a key factor lead-
ing to the 1998 ￿nancial market crisis - margin calls forced the hedge fund Long Term Capital
Management to liquidate its large leveraged positions in ￿xed income securities while not
enough capital came to absorb its liquidation. Froot and O￿ Connell (1999) show that the
supply of capital in the catastrophe insurance market is inelastic because there are times dur-
ing which the price of catastrophe insurance seems to be high and the capital of catastrophe
insurers is low. Other examples include the depressed convertible bond market after con-
vertible hedge funds faced large redemption of capital from investors in 2005 (e.g., Mitchell,
Pedersen, and Pulvino, 2008), the temporary price discount for stocks after ￿re sales by mu-
tual funds (e.g., Coval and Sta⁄ord, 2007), and the distressed market for newly down-graded
junk bonds (e.g., Da and Gao, 2008).
Our model provides a new hypothesis for capital immobility during liquidity crises based
on agency frictions at the originating end of capital ￿ ow. The economy could well have
adequate capital. However, once investors distribute their capital into di⁄erent market seg-
ments through institutionally managed funds, agency considerations can motivate stringent
investment mandates on the fund managers, which in turn con￿ne the capital in its initial
market segments. Even if one segment runs out of capital later and ends up in a liquidity
crisis, fund managers in other market segments may be unwilling to move in because of the
potential tracking errors. Instead, the strategic decisions of moving capital across di⁄erent
segments are largely left to the less informed investors themselves. As a result, the capital
￿ ow is likely to be delayed. Only as the crisis deteriorates will the distressed segment grad-
ually attract capital from other segments, starting from funds that face broader investment
mandates and greater tolerance for tracking errors. Eventually, investors will also recog-
nize pro￿t opportunities created by the crisis and move capital from other segments to the
27distressed segment.
Our agency based hypothesis of capital immobility complements the growing literature
that studies the impact of ￿nancial intermediaries￿capital inside the crisis market under
the premise that outside capital would not ￿ ow in (e.g., Kyle and Xiong (2001), Gromb
and Vayanos (2002), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), He and Krishnamurthy (2012a,b),
and Bolton, Santos, and Scheinkman (2011)). These studies typically motivate this premise
based on various information barrier arguments about the distressed market at the receiving
end of capital ￿ ow, e.g., outside investors hesitate to invest in the crisis market because
they cannot distinguish whether the price drop is driven by liquidity reasons or worsened
fundamentals. Our hypothesis is also di⁄erent from those based on search frictions (e.g.,
Du¢ e (2010)), who suggest that the speed of capital ￿ ow depends on the rate of random
matching between buyers and sellers.
4.2 Market Segmentation
There is growing evidence of de facto segmentation of various asset markets from the broad
￿nancial markets, even in the absence of explicit regulatory and physical constraints on
investment to these markets. For example, Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2008)
show that many emerging markets are still segmented from the global ￿nancial markets even
though the regulatory constraints on foreign investment had been largely lifted over the
past few decades. In particular, they ￿nd that after controlling for ￿nancial leverage and
earnings volatility, emerging markets display a signi￿cantly higher industrial earnings yield
(the inverse of price to earnings ratio) than that of developed countries. A common argument
is that information barriers may prevent investors from fully integrating assets of emerging
markets into their portfolios, e.g., Merton (1987). However, investors can hire professional
managers to overcome the information barriers. Then, it remains puzzling that the rapid
growth of funds specializing in emerging markets in the recent years has not eliminated the
segmentation of these markets.
Several other markets also exhibit similar de facto segmentation. In the corporate bond
market, Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) ￿nd that proxies for both changes in
the probability of future default based on standard fundamental-driven credit risk models
and for changes in the recovery rate can explain only a small fraction of the observed credit
spread changes. Instead, a market-speci￿c latent factor can explain a large fraction of the
residuals. In the mortgage-backed securities market, Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron
(2007) ￿nd that idiosyncratic prepayment risk carries a risk premium. In the S&P 500 index
28option market, Garleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman (2009) ￿nd that demand pressure in
one option contract increases its price as well as other correlated contracts. The de facto
segmentation of these markets is even more puzzling as they are mostly traded by ￿nancial
institutions and professional traders.
The narrow investment mandates derived in our model provide an explanation of the de
facto segmentation of the aforementioned markets. When (uninformed) investors delegate
their capital to a professional manager to invest in one of these markets, information barriers
in these markets make it necessary to impose a stringent investment mandate on the manager
in order to reduce agency cost in the delegation process. In other words, the manager has to
invest primarily in this particular market, say Russia, and his compensation is closely tied
to his fund performance. Thus, despite that the manager might work for well-diversi￿ed
investors, his own pricing kernel is exposed to the idiosyncratic risk of the market. The
market will exhibit de facto segmentation if the manager is the marginal investor. To sum
up, our model suggests that agency frictions can lead to market segmentation despite that
investors can hire professional managers to overcome information barriers in informationally
opaque markets.
5 Conclusion
We analyze a realistic delegated asset management problem in which a principal hires a fund
manager to invest his money in a multi-market environment. This implies that the principal
needs to motivate not only the manager￿ s e⁄ort in acquiring information, but also an invest-
ment strategy across the markets. Our model highlights a tradeo⁄ between encouraging the
manager to pursue the e¢ cient investment strategy and the agency cost of incentivizing him.
This tradeo⁄becomes especially severe when the manager can access negatively skewed risk
outside his primary market. Building on this tradeo⁄, our model explains the increasingly
stringent investment mandates faced by fund managers. Our analysis sheds light on capi-
tal immobility and market segmentation that are widely observed in ￿nancial markets and
highlights important e⁄ects of negatively skewed risk on institutional incentive structures.
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A Proofs of Propositions
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We need to verify that the manager has no incentive to deviate and invest in market .
First, consider a deviation strategy that he exerts e⁄ort on market  and then follows the
two-tiered investment strategy discussed in Section 2.4 (i.e., invest in market  when 
 = 0
and 0
 = 1). The relevant situation is when he observes a negative signal in market  and
a positive signal in market . Then, his expected utility from investing in market  is
025(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 + ￿)￿

 + 025(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 ¬ ￿)￿


+025(05 + ￿ + )(05 + ￿)￿

 + 025(05 + ￿ + )(05 ¬ ￿)￿


which, under the contract speci￿ed in Proposition 1, is equal to 025(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 + ￿)￿
;
if his expected return from investing in the risk-free asset is
(05 + ￿ + )￿
0
 + (05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )￿
0

which is equal to (05 + ￿ + )￿0
 under the contract speci￿ed in Proposition 1. As ￿
 = ￿0
,
the manager prefers to invest in the risk-free asset.
Next, we consider the deviation strategy that he exerts no e⁄ort and follows a two-tiered
investment strategy. Then, his expected utility is
025[(1 + 2￿) + (05 ¬ ￿)(05 + ￿)]￿

 + 025(05 + ￿)(05 + ￿)￿


+025[(1 ¬ 2￿) + (05 + ￿)(05 ¬ ￿)]￿






 + 025(05 ¬ ￿)￿
0

which is modi￿ed from equation (14) by removing the manager￿ s e⁄ort. Under the contract
given in Proposition 1, the manager￿ s expected utility is equal to
025[(1 + 2￿) + (05 ¬ ￿)(05 + ￿)]￿

 + 025(05 + ￿)￿
0

= 025[(05 ¬ ￿)(05 + ￿) + 15 + 3￿]


 025[(05 ¬ ￿) + 15 + 3￿]






By substituting the equilibrium contract into equation 8, the manager￿ s expected utility from
exerting e⁄ort and following the single-market strategy is 05(1 + 2￿) 
, which is strictly
higher than that from the deviation strategy.
30A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We need to minimize the expected compensation cost in (20) subject to the two incentive







￿rst-order conditions subject to the two constraints are
(1 + 2￿ + 2) + (05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 + ￿)
0 [¬1 (￿
)]
￿ ￿1(15 ¬ ￿)+￿2 (05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 + ￿)
(25)
with equality if ￿
  0;
(05 + ￿ + )(05 + ￿)
0 [¬1 (￿
)]
￿ ￿1(05 + ￿) + ￿2 (05 + ￿ + )(05 + ￿) (26)
with equality if ￿
  0;





￿￿ ￿ ¬￿1(15 + ￿)+￿2 (05 + ￿ + )(05 ¬ ￿)
(27)
with equality if ￿
  0;
(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 ¬ ￿)
0 [¬1 (￿
)]
￿ ¬￿1(05 ¬ ￿) + ￿2 (05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 ¬ ￿) (28)
with equality if ￿
  0;
(05 + ￿ + )
0 [¬1 (￿0
)]
￿ ￿1 ¬ ￿2 (05 + ￿ + ) (29)
with equality if ￿0
  0;
(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )
0 [¬1 (￿0
)]
￿ ¬￿1 ¬ ￿2 (05 ¬ ￿ ¬ ) (30)
with equality if ￿0
  0.
The following lemma veri￿es that both ￿1 and ￿2 are positive.
Lemma 1 ￿1  0 and ￿2  0.
Proof. First, the incentive constraint in (16) must be binding. This is because if this con-
straint is slack, the solution to minimize the compensation cost would be to set all payments
to be zero. This solution, however, violates the constraint in (16). Thus, ￿1  0. Now
suppose that ￿1  0 but ￿2 = 0, i.e., the constraint in (19) is slack. By minimizing the































05 + ￿ + 
￿1










Since 0 [¬1 (￿)] is strictly decreasing in ￿, we have our claim. Now given this, it is direct
to verify that this solution violates the constraint in (19). Therefore, both constraints must
be binding, i.e., ￿1  0 and ￿2  0.
As ￿1  0 and ￿2  0, the right-hand side of equation (30) is negative. Thus, ￿0
 = 0.
Intuitively, this is because ￿0
 has a negative incentive di⁄erential   0 in both of the
incentive constraints (16) and (19).
The following lemma further determines ￿
 and ￿
 to be zero.
Lemma 2 If ￿0
  0 then ￿
 = ￿
 = 0.
Proof. Based on (29), ￿0
  0 requires that ￿1  ￿2 (05 + ￿ + ). Therefore, ￿
 = 0 and
￿
 = 0 because the right-hand side of (27) and (28) are negative, while the left-hand side is
always positive.
As a result, there are only three positive payments: ￿
, ￿0
, and ￿
 in the least costly
contract. These three payments, together with ￿1 and ￿2, satisfy the binding incentive
constraints in (16) and (19):
(15 ¬ ￿)e￿





 = 4 (31)
(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 + ￿)￿

 + (05 + ￿ + )(05 + ￿)￿

 ¬ (05 + ￿ + )￿
0
 = 0 (32)
and the ￿rst-order-conditions in (25), (26), (29).






Proof. Since ￿2  0, equations (26) and (29) directly imply that ￿
  ￿0








(15 ¬ ￿)￿1 + (05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 + ￿)￿2
(1 + 2￿ + 2) + (05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 + ￿)

(15 ¬ ￿)￿1






05+￿+ + ￿2, it su¢ ces to show that
15 ¬ ￿
(1 + 2￿ + 2) + (05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 + ￿)

1
05 + ￿ + 
which holds because 15 ¬ ￿  2.
32We need to verify that the manager will not pursue any deviation strategy. Two of these
strategies have been considered in the main text. Consider the following deviation strategy:
the manager shirks; he invests in market  if 0
 = 1, otherwise he gambles in market 




 + 025(05 + ￿)￿

 + 025[15 ¬ ￿]￿

 + 025(05 ¬ ￿)￿

 (33)
to be dominated by his expected utility given in (14). Another deviation strategy is shirking,
investing in market  if  = 1, and otherwise gambling in market . To prevent the use of
this strategy we also require that the manager￿ s expected utility from this strategy
025[15 + ￿]￿

 + 025(05 + ￿)￿

 + 025[15 ¬ ￿]￿

 + 025(05 ¬ ￿)￿

 (34)
to be dominated by that in (14). Note that ￿
  ￿
 and ￿
 = 0 in the derived optimal
contract. As ￿ ￿ ￿, the manager￿ s expected utility from using the ￿rst deviation strategy
in (33) dominates that from using the second one in (34). Therefore to verify that (33) is
dominated by (14) it su¢ ces to show that
[1 + 2￿ + (05 ¬ ￿)(05 + ￿)]￿

 + (05 + ￿)(05 + ￿)￿

 + (05 + ￿)￿
0

￿ (15 + ￿)￿

 + (05 + ￿)￿


which is equivalent to
[(05 ¬ ￿)￿

 + (05 + ￿)￿









 + (05 + ￿)￿

](05 ¬ ￿)  [(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )￿







(05 + ￿ + )￿
0

where the second equality is derived from the binding constraint in (19). Therefore, the




(05 + ￿ + )  05 + ￿ (35)
which requires that  is relatively small.
Finally, the manager could also shirk and always invest in market  To prevent the use









the binding constraint in (19), it su¢ ces to show the following condition:
￿
1 + 2￿ + (05 ¬ ￿)(05 + ￿) +
(05 + ￿)(05 + ￿)(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )












33which holds under the following su¢ cient condition
2(05 + ￿)(05 + ￿)  1 (36)
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Based on the least costly contract derived in Proposition 2, the expected compensation cost
of implementing the two-tiered strategy is
 = 025[(1 + 2￿ + 2) + (05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 + ￿)]¬1 (￿
)
+025(05 + ￿ + )(05 + ￿)¬1 (￿





which is greater than
025[(05 + ￿ + )(15 ¬ ￿)]
¬1 (￿












Suppose we minimize (37) by using nonnegative ￿
 ￿
 and ￿0
 subject to (16). It should
be clear that the minimum is lower than . The minimum is
¬
1



















































This in turn implies that  
¬
1










We now show that  ¬ is increasing in . Note that in solving for the least costly
contract in implementing the two-tiered strategy, (25), (26), (29), (31) and (32) have the
feature that the solution f￿
￿
￿0
g are proportional to , and f￿1￿2g are proportional to

￿
1¬ ￿ (note that when  () = 1¬￿, 1
0[¬ 1(￿)] / ￿
￿
1¬ ￿ / 
￿
1¬ ￿). As a result, the expected cost
 is proportional to 
1
1¬ ￿. Proposition 1 implies that the same statement also holds for
. As a result,  ¬  is proportional to 
1
1¬ ￿ As  ¬  is positive, it must
be increasing with .
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
We ￿rst show that (23) is binding when ￿ is su¢ ciently large. Since the left-hand side of
(23) is independent of ￿ while the right-hand side increases with ￿, we only need to show
that there exists one value of ￿ so that the least costly contract derived in Proposition 2
34(which does not incorporate the constraint in (23)) violates (23). Because of the binding
constraint in (16), we only need to show
[(1 + 2￿) + (05 ¬ ￿)(05 + ￿)]￿










Let ￿ = 05 + ￿. Then, we need to show that
(05 ¬ ￿)(05 + ￿)￿

 + (05 + ￿)￿
0







 in the contract, it su¢ ces to show that
(05 ¬ ￿)(05 + ￿)  (05 + ￿)(05 ¬ ￿)
which holds since ￿  ￿.
To verify the second part of the proposition, we need to derive the ￿rst order conditions
for deriving the least costly contract. We repeat the minimization of the total compensation
cost in (20) subject to constraints in (16), (19) and (23). We denote the Lagrange multiplier
of the new constraint by ￿3 ￿ 0. The ￿rst order conditions for the 6 payments are now given
below:
(1 + 2￿ + 2) + (05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 + ￿)
0 [¬1 (￿
)]
￿ ￿1(15 ¬ ￿) + ￿2 (05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 + ￿)
+￿3 [1 + 2￿ + 2 ¬ 2￿ + (05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 + ￿)] (38)
with equality if ￿
  0;
(05 + ￿ + )(05 + ￿)
0 [¬1 (￿
)]
￿ ￿1(05 + ￿) + ￿2 (05 + ￿ + )(05 + ￿)
¬￿3 [2￿ ¬ (05 + ￿ + )(05 + ￿)] (39)
with equality if ￿
  0;





￿￿ ￿ ¬￿1(15 + ￿) + ￿2 (05 + ￿ + )(05 ¬ ￿)
+￿3 [1 ¬ 2￿ ¬ 2 + (05 + ￿ + )(05 ¬ ￿)] (40)
with equality if ￿
  0;
(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 ¬ ￿)
0 [¬1 (￿
)]
￿ ¬￿1(05 ¬ ￿) + ￿2 (05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 ¬ ￿)
+￿3 (05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 ¬ ￿) (41)
with equality if ￿
  0;
(05 + ￿ + )
0 [¬1 (￿0
)]
￿ ￿1 ¬ ￿2 (05 + ￿ + ) + ￿3 (05 + ￿ + ) (42)
35with equality if ￿0
  0;
(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )
0 [¬1 (￿0
)]
￿ ¬￿1 ¬ ￿2 (05 ¬ ￿ ¬ ) + ￿3 (05 ¬ ￿ ¬ ) (43)
with equality if ￿0
  0.
By comparing (41) and (43), it is easy to show that ￿
 = 0 implies that ￿0
 = 0. This
implies that we only need to compare ￿
 and ￿




05 + ￿ + 
+ ￿2 (05 ¬ ￿) + ￿3 (05 ¬ ￿) + ￿3
1 ¬ 2￿ ¬ 2
05 + ￿ + 
(44)
is positive and zero otherwise; while ￿
 is positive if
¬￿1
05 ¬ ￿
05 ¬ ￿ ¬ 
+ ￿2 (05 ¬ ￿) + ￿3 (05 ¬ ￿) (45)
is positive and zero otherwise. Now consider the following su¢ cient condition that
05 + ￿  2￿ + 2
Under this su¢ cient condition, we have
15 + ￿
05 + ￿ + 

05 ¬ ￿
05 ¬ ￿ ¬ 

This implies that (44) is greater than (45), i.e., ￿
 becomes positive before ￿
 turns positive.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
The argument for the agency cost to be increasing with  follows the same argument in
Proposition 3, which implies that the expected compensation cost is of order 
1
1¬ ￿. Note that
the derivative of the expected compensation cost with respect to ￿ is 05￿3 (￿
 + ￿
) ￿ 0,
which is strictly positive when the constraint in (23) is binding. Therefore the expected
compensation cost in the presence of tail risk increases with ￿, and as a result ￿ is decreases
with ￿.
B An Alternative Model Setting
In this appendix, we adopt an alternative model setting, in which the manager can invest in
both markets  and  and face no short-sales constraints. We show that the key result of
our main paper remains robust in this alternative setting.
The primary market  and the outside market  are speci￿ed in the same way as in the
main model, except that the manager can short sell. That is to say, the manager to take
36either a long or short position in both markets simultaneously based on his signals  and
. We still restrict the size of the position to be one unit. There is no need for the manager
to take a zero position as such a position is always dominated by either a long or short
position depending on the manager￿ s signal. This alternative setting relaxes two simplifying
assumptions used in the main model￿ the restrictions on the manager￿ s positions in multiple
markets and short sales.
B.1 Single-Market Strategy
We ￿rst analyze the single-market strategy. Suppose that the principal implements the single
market strategy, i.e., the manager takes a long (short) position of one unit in market  if
 = 1 ( = ¬1), and always ignores his free signal on market  and takes no position
outside market  As a result, the fund performance can take two possible values e  2 f¬g
and the benchmark return of market  can be e  2 f¬g. Hence, the incentive contract



















The manager￿ s expected utility from working (i.e., exerting e⁄ort to improve his signal
about market ) is
E
￿






(05 + ￿ + )￿

 + (05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )￿

 + (05 + ￿ + )￿






For instance, the manager receives ￿
 when  = ¬ (which has a probability of 05) and
when he receives 
 = ¬1 (which has a conditional probability of 05 + ￿ + ). Similarly,













 + (05 ¬ ￿)￿

 + (05 + ￿)￿














￿  Following the same argu-










Furthermore, to prevent deviation, the contract pays zero if the fund delivers ￿2 which
immediately reveals that the manager has invested in . Hence, the principal￿ s expected
payo⁄ from implementing this single-market strategy is

 = 2(￿ + ) ¬ (05 + ￿ + )
¬1 () (47)
37B.2 Double-Market Strategy
We now consider implementing a so-called double-market strategy￿ the ￿rst-best investment
strategy of taking a long position of one unit in market  ( 2 fg) whenever the signal
 = 1 or a short position of one unit if  = ¬1. That is, the manager invests in both
markets and independently determines a long or short position in each market based on his
signal about the market.
Aggregating the manager￿ s positions in the two markets leads to three possible fund
return:
e  2 f20¬2g
When combined with the two possible returns in the primary market (which the principal























With slight abuse of notation, in the superscript  refers to e  = 2 and  refers to e  = ¬2;
while in the subscript  refers to e  =  and  refers to e  = ¬
We derive the manager￿ s expected utility from working based on the following six possible
payments:
1. To receive payment ￿
 the fund return e  = 2 and the primary market return e  = .
This is possible only if the manager take long positions in both markets, and both
markets have positive returns. With probability 05 market  has positive return,
and the manager takes a long position there with probability 05 + ￿ + . There
are two scenarios to yield a positive return from market : either the market  is
positive (with probability 05) and the manager takes a long position (with probability
05 + ￿) or the market  is negative (with probability 05) but the manager takes a
short position (with probability 05+￿). Taken together, the probability of receiving
payment ￿
 is 05(05 + ￿ + )(05 + ￿)
2. To receive payment ￿
 the fund performance return e  = ¬2 and the primary market
return e  = ¬. This is possible only if the manager take long positions in both
markets, and both markets have positive returns. Similar to Case 1, the probability of
receiving payment ￿
 is 05(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 ¬ ￿)
3. To receive payment ￿0
 the fund performance return e  = 0 and the primary market
return e  =  (which has probability 05). There are two scenarios to reach this out-
come: either because the manager takes a long position in market  (with probability
3805 + ￿ + ) and a losing position in market  (with probability 05 ¬ ￿) or be-
cause the manager takes a short position in market  (with probability 05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )
and a winning position in market  (with probability 05 + ￿). Taken together, the
probability for the manager to receive this payment is
05[(05 + ￿ + )(05 ¬ ￿) + (05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 + ￿)] (48)
4. Similarly, the probability for the manager to receive payment ￿0
 is
05[(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 + ￿) + (05 + ￿ + )(05 ¬ ￿)]
5. Similarly, the probability to receive payment ￿
 is 05(05 + ￿ + )(05 + ￿)
6. Similarly, the probability to receive payment ￿
 is 05(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 ¬ ￿)
Hence, the manager￿ s expected utility from working is
05[(05 + ￿ + )(05 + ￿)]￿

 + 05[(05 + ￿ + )(05 + ￿)]￿


+05[(05 + ￿ + )(05 ¬ ￿) + (05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 + ￿)]￿
0

+05[(05 + ￿ + )(05 ¬ ￿) + (05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 + ￿)]￿
0

+05(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 ¬ ￿)￿

 + 05(05 ¬ ￿ ¬ )(05 ¬ ￿)￿

 ¬ 
His expected utility from shirking is setting  = 0 in the above expression and deleting .
Thus, the incentive constraint is
05(05 + ￿)￿

 + 05(05 + ￿)￿

 (49)




 + 05(05 ¬ ￿)￿

 + 05(05 ¬ ￿)￿


Note that for some of the outcomes, investing in market  makes the manager￿ s good
performance in the primary market unclear to the principal, and hence reduces the e¢ ciency
of incentive provision. For instance, consider payment ￿0
. The manager may have received a
positive signal about the primary market and thus a good performance in his primary market
position, together with a bad performance from his position in market  (due to ex post
inaccurate signal ). Alternatively, the manager may have received a negative signal about
the primary market and thus a poor performance in his primary market position, together
with a good performance from his position in market  (due to ex post accurate signal ).
Because of the o⁄setting performance of the manager￿ s positions in these two markets and
because of the inability for the principal to directly observe the manager￿ s position in the







 is negative in (49). As a
result, the least costly contract gives the manager zero payment for this outcome. Like in
the main model, the interfered inference of the manager￿ s position in the primary market by
his position in market  is the key driver of our result.
39B.3 Optimal Contract
To show that the single-market strategy may dominate the double-market strategy, we only
need to identify an upper bound of the principal￿ s expected payo⁄ from the double-market
strategy. The upper bound is identi￿ed by assuming that the incentive constraint in (49),
which only considers the deviation of shirking but still following the intended investment
strategy, is the only binding constraint in solving the contract. In the main model, another
deviation provides an additional binding constraint, which always lowers the principal￿ s
expected payo⁄.
With the incentive constraint in (49) as the only binding constraint, the least costly

















and the principal￿ s expected payo⁄ is








That   in (47) exceeds   in (50) is equivalent to






¬ (05 + ￿ + )
¬1 ()  2￿







05 + ￿ + 

which easily holds when ￿ ! 0 or when  is su¢ ciently large. Based on the analysis above,
we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 6 When the manager￿ s cost of e⁄ort in his primary market is su¢ ciently high
or when the manager￿ s free signal about market  is su¢ ciently imprecise, the single-market
strategy of only investing in the primary market dominates the double-market strategy of
investing in both markets based on the manager￿ s signals, even though the manager￿ s signal
about market  is nevertheless useful.
The driver of this result works in the same way as the main model. As the principal cannot
directly observe the manager￿ s investment positions and the fund performance aggregates
the manager￿ s returns from both markets, investing in both markets impedes the principal￿ s
inference problem of the manager￿ s e⁄ort and thus makes incentive provision more costly.
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